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Abstract
The paper analyzes the joint evolution of accumulation and dis-
tribution of human capital in an OLG framework. Dynamics arises
as a result of a continuous interplay between features of the human
capital distribution and individual variables - inherited human capital
and inborn ability. Such interaction drives individual investment in
human capital and accumulation in the economy. According to the
initial distribution the model provides di¤erent dynamical behaviours
linking growth and inequality; in general more equal economies grow
faster, and with less social con‡icts, than the ones characterized by
high inequality in the initial distribution, but several other cases are
possible. Moreover, since the model provides an endogenous threshold
for investing in human capital, the …nal distribution is characterized
by multimodality.
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11 Introduction.1
The recent years have been characterized by a large number of contributions
in the …eld of personal distribution and economic growth whose aim is to shed
a light on the interplay between these two important economic variables; such
a line of research relies mainly on the human capital approach to economic
growth. A …rst strand of this research concluded that a trade-o¤ exists be-
tween growth and inequality, in sense that a higher inequality, calling for
considerable redistributive schemes, depresses the accumulation; following
re…nements of the research have in some cases reversed such a result, con-
cluding that more equal economies grow faster thanks to low social con‡icts.
More recently, several authors have stressed the importance of social, local
and parental variables on the accumulation of human capital, as a source of
strati…cation and segregation among individuals belonging to a given com-
munity; in general the …nal e¤ect of such social exclusion is a slowing down
in the growth process. These works focuses on the presence of spillovers
among individuals, or communities, which a¤ect the individual investment
in human capital; these ”neighborhood” e¤ects, as de…ned by Benabou[4]
and Durlauf[8], introduce some complementarities in the individual choices,
thanks to which the human capital in the economy a¤ects the individual
behaviour but, at the same time, is itself a¤ected. From this continuous
interplay between ”micro” and ”macro” variables emerges the common dy-
namics of growth and distribution, which is very often related to the initial
conditions. Recent works - Galor and Tsiddon [11], Benabou[4], Durlauf[8],
Gradstein and Justman[14] - show that the interplay between ”local” home
environment variables, as the parental level of human capital, and the global
technological externality governs the evolutionary patterns of the distribu-
tion of human capital, the distribution of income and economic growth2. In
Gradstein and Justman the average human capital a¤ects the individual earn-
ing capacity with the result that We …nd little con‡ict between democracies
and growth3, while in Durlauf Parents a¤ect the conditional probability dis-
tribution of their children’s income through the choice of a neighborhood in
which to live. Neighborhood location a¤ects children both through local pub-
1I started to work on this paper during my visiting spent at Nu¢eld College, University
of Oxford; I am indebted to Anthony Atkinson for helpful comments and suggestions.
Usual disclaimers apply.
2Galor and Tsiddon, 1997, page 93.
3Gradstein and Justman, 1997, page 169.
2lic …nance of education as well as through sociological e¤ects4. Finally, in
Benabou, where complementarities exist both in the individual technology
for human capital and in the demand curve for the intermediate inputs, the
…nal e¤ect is that Integration tends to slow down growth in the short run yet
raise it in the long run5.
The present work should be placed among these recent works, since it
focuses on the interplay between the distribution of human capital in the
economy and the individual behaviour. We perform this in an imperfect
labour market characterized by bargaining; the latter is necessary because of
the presence of asymmetric information between …rms and workers. Bargain-
ing over unskilled workers provides a reference point for a second bargaining
involving skilled agents.
In the model we are going to assume that the individual investment in hu-
man capital comes from a ”cost-bene…t” analysis, given the inherited human
capital, schooling cost, genetic ability, unskilled wage, and the employment
rate of the previous generation, which depends on the human capital dis-
tribution. In this way both micro and macro variables a¤ect the individual
choice. The private agent chooses the investment in human capital if the dis-
counted ‡ow of future income is higher than the wage obtained working as
”unskilled”. Individual choices update the stock of human capital in the econ-
omy, modifying the distribution which, in its turn, a¤ects the accumulation
of human capital for the next generation and so on. This path-dependence
gives birth to a rather complex stochastic process (i.e. a non-linear Markov
Chain) describing the evolution of human capital, which will be investigated
through a qualitative analysis6.
The interplay between accumulation and distribution of human capital
gives birth to an endogenous poverty trap whose measure depends on the
characteristics of the distribution itself; according to the initial conditions,
the economy can exhibit lowaccumulation with high inequalityand viceversa,
and the transition to the poverty trap follows monotonic or oscillatory trajec-
tories. The model shows a strong dependence of results on the characteristics
4Durlauf, 1996, page 75.
5Benabou, 1996, page 584.
6Linear Markov chains can be analyzed dynamically by means of an approximation in
continuos time, i.e. via Fokker Planck equation, which is a parabolic partial di¤erential
equation. An application to the analysis of human capital distribution is provided in
Giannini[13]. Nevertheless, the resulting Fokker Planck equation for a non linear chain
does not allow a closed form solution. Details are in appendix.
3of the human capital distribution and parameters; in general more unequal
initial distributions tend to enlarge the poverty trap, slowing down accumu-
lation and increasing inequality. Nevertheless further cases are possible and
inequality in the initial conditions not always imply a lower accumulation. In
other words, the main conclusion o¤ered by the model relies on the fact that
the relationship between growth and distribution can be extremely compli-
cated and attempts in providing a well-established and predictable linkage
could be frustrated. This makes di¢cult to compare di¤erent economies as
well as di¤erent initial conditions; the paper tries to embed the dynamics
in a series of propositions, but the paper itself shows as the …nal result is
particularly sensitive to parameters and initial distribution.
2 The Model.
The economy described by the model involves non-altruistic, heterogeneous
individuals living for two periods in overlapping generations. Sources of het-
erogeneity are: endowment of human capital and innate ability; the latter
does not a¤ect the individual productivity on job, which is solely related to
human capital, but in‡uences the educational e¤ort. The human capital is
distributed among the N agents in the economy according to the distribution
G(h), c.d.f. hereafter, with density g(h); hence
R H
0 dG(h) represents the per-
centage of population whose human capital is equal or less to H. The birth
of each individual coincides with the end of compulsory school; for such a
reason, in the …rst period of life, agents must decide whether to invest in
higher education or to work as ”unskilled”. Hence the investment in human
capital follows a binary choice, and for ”unskilled worker” is meant an in-
dividual who does not invest in higher education at the end of compulsory
school, giving up to signal herself as skilled agent. The latter instead invests
in higher education so as to increase her human capital endowment by a …xed
quantity; we are in fact measuring human capital as a discrete variable - edu-
cational quali…cation - rather as a continuous variable - length of education.
As far as …rms is concerned, they are characterized by a technology whose
only argument is the worker’s human capital - yi = (hi)
® ;® < 1; for the i¡th
…rm - but they are di¤erent with respect to the type of hired worker (skilled
or unskilled); we are going to come back on this point after describing the
informative question entailed in the model. Finally, since at each instant t
the labour supply changes jointly to the distribution of the human capital in
4the economy, I assume a unitary horizon of production.
Although the model does not involve an intentional bequest of human
capital from parents to o¤spring, a key assumption of the model is that such
intergenerational transfer does exist thanks to parental spillovers; this involve
a strong form of heterogeneity among workers, even among ”unskilled work-
ers”. In other words, I assume that unskilled workers are characterized by a
di¤erent human capital, even if they do not update the latter at the end of
compulsory school. Unskilled workers know their human capital endowment
and innate ability, since the time spent in compulsory school is su¢cient to
reveal the latter to themselves. Nevertheless this information is private and
…rms are not able to identify the human capital of an unskilled worker by
means of education, since this kind of workers are characterized by a common
educational quali…cation; this means that such asymmetry of information can
not be ruled out by means of education, as in the Cho and Kreps’[6], solution
to the Spence’s model. As it will be clearer later, the model involves a budget
constraint due to the cost of investing in higher education, which causes less
endowed individuals not to invest in human capital. The presence of such a
constraint in the signal set produces a break down of the separating equilib-
rium provided by Cho and Kreps, with the result that pooling equilibria are
also possible in such a context (see Cho and Sobel [7], for a general analy-
sis of the problem and Giannini [12], for the particular case of the Spence’s
model).
As previously stated, the model assumes two types of …rms according
to the characteristic of the hired worker; a key assumption is given by the
impossibility for a …rm to change its type. Stated di¤erently, technology is
characterized by di¤erent ”slots”, ranked by human capital, and each slot
represents a …rm. Slots can be ordered, being in a one-to-one relation with
human capital, and partitioned in two subsets, say A and B; each slot be-
longing to A is …lled by ”unskilled workers” and viceversa. At the same way,
human capital can be divided into two separated subsets, depending on the
individual choice about human capital investment. The threshold separating
unskilled from skilled agents, hc, is the main object of the paper.
The set of assumptions stated so far requires two di¤erent strategies, for
…rms, in hiring workers; as said in fact, the informative problem a¤ects only
…rms hiring unskilled workers which can not infer the real worker productivity
by means of the educational choice. Such imperfection opens to the possi-
bility of a mismatch between workers and ”slots”, or …rms. The signalling
approach before mentioned, suggests that in a situation characterized by a
5common educational choice for workers - pooling equilibrium - the …rm ”best
reply” - wage - acts on the base of an average productivity; in our situation
such behaviour is not viable, since the possibility of a mismatch is not ruled
out. Moreover, because of the length of the productive process, workers’
human capital can not be revealed ”on job”.
Under an assumption of risk aversion for …rms, the uncertainty caused by
the mismatch can be faced adopting a cooperative behaviour, in sense that
…rms have an advantage in constituting a trust acting as a representative …rm
on the base of the average productivity of the unskilled workers, and redis-
tributing equally the total pro…t among …rms which hire this type of workers,
providing a form of risk sharing. The production function taken into account







´ ; is the
average productivity and Lu
t the employment among unskilled workers. The
workers’ reply to such a cooperative behaviour is the creation of a workers’
union bargaining for wages7; the reference point for wage is the reservation
one, which is assumed to be the same for every unskilled worker. At the
same time, …rms receive from bargaining an equal pro…t with certainty in-
stead of a higher pro…t with uncertainty. For these reasons, I assume that,
for unskilled workers, the union tries to maximize the distance between the
wage and the reference point, i.e. the reservation wage, independently from
the workers’ endowment, and at the same time, …rms union maximize the
distance between current pro…t and the reference point, i.e. the zero pro…t.
2.1 Bargaining over unskilled wage.
In the following we are going to assume that unskilled workers are organized
in a trust from which they are randomly drawn; the number of unskilled
workers is Mt = N
R hct
0 dG(ht); where hct is the level of human capital sep-
arating unskilled from skilled individuals and N the population - stationary
by assumption. All union members are treated uniformly and the union util-
ity function is simply the sum of the individual ones. As stated, the wage
for unskilled workers comes from an asymmetric Nash bargaining function
where the workers’ union sets the wage and …rms the employment level Lu
t as
a consequence; in the following we are going to assume Lu
t < Mt: The Nash
7Since bargaining involves unemployment, we are implicitly assuming that bene…ts of
forming a union are at least equals to the costs in term of unemployment.















t is the bargained wage. Both utility and production function in-
volved in the game are characterized by a monotonic, increasing, concave
graph; we are hence assuming diminishing returns to scale in the labour per
e¢ciency unit for the representative …rm. By maximizing the (1) w.r.t. wu
t

















t F(¹ yt;Lu(¹ yt))
¯U0wu
t + (1 ¡ ¯))[U(wu
t ) ¡ U(R)]
(3)
with Lu0(¹ yt) > 0: Eq. (2) shows the wage as a weighted average between
the mean and marginal productivity. In this way a CES production function
provides a wage rigidity until there are available workers.













U(w)¡U(R) is the union’s incremental elasticity of substitution.
By assuming F(¹ ytLu(¹ yt)) = (¹ ytLu(¹ yt))®; U(wu
t ) = (wu
t)
¾
¾ ;¾ < 1; and











































72.2 Bargaining over skilled wage.
The presence of skilled individuals in the economy opens to a one-to-one
bargaining between …rms hiring skilled workers and the latter; the key as-
sumption in this case is represented by the perfect signalling provided by the
investment in higher education; this implies absence of mismatch and unem-
ployment for skilled individuals. Firms can increase their per-worker pro…t,
at the beginning of time t + 1, beyond the level of ¼u
t; by hiring individuals
with human capital h > hct; at the same time, individuals invest in higher
education if they receive a wage ws > ¹ wu = pwu + (1 ¡ p)R; where p is the
probability to be employed as unskilled worker: In this way, players maximize






















t > hct: By so doing we obtain the















which is a mark-up on the unskilled wage.
2.3 The individual behaviour
As said, economy is populated by a continuum of heterogenous agents, of
mass N, living for two periods in overlapping generations; individuals are
born at each instant t and they are old in t + 1. I assume that each indi-
vidual has one child, so population is stationary. At the birth each agent is
endowed with human capital inherited from the parents: I assume that the
parental human capital accumulated during the life accrues completely to the
o¤spring through family spillovers rather than an intentional bequest. More-
over, at the birth, Nature sets the individual’s inborn ability, ²i; according
to a n:i:i:d:(0;¾2
²) law. Each individual is characterized, ex-post, by a given
² coe¢cient. Birth coincides with the end of compulsory school. In this way,
at the birth t, each individual i knows:
1. Her inherited human capital, hi
t;
2. Her inborn ability, i.e. the ²i ex-post realization;
83. The critical human capital in the previous generation, hct¡1; hence em-
ployment in the previous generation.
By using this information set, the individual decision making acts as
follows: in the …rst period of life the agent decides whether to invest in higher
education, increasing her stock of human capital and employing herself in the
second period of life, or to work for both periods. The agent performs such
a decision comparing the discounted income stream in both cases. In the
…rst case - schooling - the individual goes to school during her youth; such a
process involves a cost, both in pecuniary and e¤ort term and at this end I
assume that it consists of a …xed component Â, representing the pecuniary
term, and a variable one, represented by the individual ability coe¢cient ²i: In
this way the scholastic cost is ci = Â+²i; individuals characterized by ²i < 0
are highly skilled and their scholastic cost is lower than the ones having ²i >
0: Individuals investing in human capital can borrow from an international
…nancial market at the constant world rate r; in order to cover the pecuniary
cost Â; since their inherited human capital can not be traded or resold. Note
that the ability parameter, which is known ex-post to the individual, can
operate either in a positive or in a negative way when related to the inherited
human capital, in sense that individuals characterized by a high inherited
human capital but low aptitudes - ² high - are not di¤erent from individuals
in the opposite situation. Conversely, individuals characterized both by a
high inherited human capital and a negative skill coe¢cient are particularly
endowed. In other words, the dynamics of the individual human capital is
driven by the convolution of two distributive laws: the one related to the
inherited human capital and the one describing the inborn ability.
Viceversa if the i¡th individual employes herself from the …rst period of
life, she simply receives the central wage wu in both periods. Nevertheless,
due to the unemployment among unskilled workers, the wage wu is obtained
according to a given probability; I assume that such probability is given by
pt =
Lt¡1
Mt¡1; i.e. by the employment rate at the end of the previous period,
which enters in the individual information set at the beginning of the deci-
sional horizon ; for the same reason the reservation wage is obtained with
probability (1 ¡ pt):
In this way the individual decision about human capital investment is
performed comparing the following valuation indexes W - life income stream





















t + ± (5)
W
i
ut = ¹ w
u
t + ¸ ¹ w
u
t+1 with ¹ w
u = pw
u + (1¡ p)R
where ¸ is the discount factor. The …rst equation shows the income stream
when the agent decides to stay at school during youth; the …rst term on
the R.H.S. (Right Hand Side) is the discounted - expected - wage, net of
refunding, which accrues to the individual during the second period of life
while the second one is the scholastic cost which must be paid during the
…rst period. The second equation represents the income stream in case the
individual decides to work in both periods.
By so doing we obtain a simple investment decision rule: if Wi
s > Wi
u
then the i¡th agent prefers schooling to working during youth. By de…ning
the variable zi = Wi
s ¡ Wi













+ ¸(1 + r)Â + (Â + ²t) + ptw
u + (1¡ pt)R
#
(6)
and the i¡ th agent invests in human capital only if zi ¸ 0:
Individuals not investing in human capital do not update their inherited
human capital 8. With such a remark the individual human capital evolves























In this way each individual decides the level of human capital during youth;
such a level is preserved during the working life and totally transmitted to
the o¤spring, although there is not altruistic behaviour in the model.
2.4 The Marginal Agent.
In this section we are going to analyze the behaviour of the marginal agent,
for whom z = 0; which implies hi
t+1 = hct +±; at the moment we investigate
the deterministic case, viz. for ²i = 0: From Eq. (6) we have:





































Equation (7) is a …rst-order di¤erence equation in hct on hct¡1 and Gt¡1:
The problem that we have to face in this equation is the fact that we do
not know the evolution of G over time; the latter is a¤ected recursively by hc
which in turn is a¤ected by G itself. The peculiarity of equation (7) is to be a
Markov chain whose transition probabilities depend on the distribution itself
and for such a reason it is not possible apply the conventional dynamical
operators, as for instance the Fokker-Planck equation for approximation in
continuous time; technical details are provided in appendix; in the following
we are going to provide a qualitative analysis.
We start at t = 0 with a given distribution of human capital in the econ-
omy; at this time Nature draws randomly the threshold hc0 so as individuals
whose initial human capital lies below hc0 do not invest in human capital and
vice versa; such an investment process modi…es the human capital distribu-
tion and (7) provides a new value for hc1 and so on. The mechanics involves a
complex relationship between the characteristics of the human capital distri-
bution and the individual behaviour. To describe it we start from the e¤ect
of hc on the human capital c.d.f.. We said that individuals characterized by
a human capital higher than the critical level do invest in human capital, in-
creasing their distance from individuals trapped below hc: The e¤ect on the
human capital distribution is to shift forward individuals above the critical
level, increasing dispersion and creating a bimodality in the curve; Figure
1 shows the result in term of the human capital c.d.f.. Such a bimodality
is involved in eq. (7) since the c.d.f. Gt(ht) is present in the r.h.s. of the
equation; it is worth stressing that the di¤erence between Gt and Gt+1 lies
only in the distribution of individuals above hc. Next proposition gives a
qualitative analysis of equation (7):
Proposition 1 According to the ® coe¢cient, equation (7) is steadily de-









line. Nevertheless the position of (7) in the plane







Figure 1: C.d.f. between t and t + 1
changes in hc, shifts (7) in the space according to ®: Such a shifting a¤ects
the transition to the steady state h¤
c.
Proof. We begin with the …rst part of the proposition. Looking at equation









and it is straightforward to see that lim
hc!1 V = (m®)
®
1¡® where m® is the
® ¡ th moment of G(h). Instead when hc approaches zero, V can be either
















The second term on the r.h.s. is independent from ® which a¤ects only the
…rst one; the latter tends to a negative unbounded value when hc approaches
zero from the right and vice versa for the former, given the sign in front of
12Figure 2: Modi…cation of V induced by ®
it. Nevertheless, being ®
1¡® 2 [0;1); the velocity of divergence of the …rst
term is greatly a¤ected, in a positive way, by the value of ® ; in other words,
according to ®; the …rst term can be a superior or inferior in…nity w.r.t.










; causing eq. (7) to
show a decreasing pattern whose slope depends negatively on ®: As far as
® increases, the order of divergence of the two terms changes, inducing in
(7) an upward slope which is as steep as ® is high and an intercept which
tends to zero. It is worth stressing that the slope of (7) is also a¤ected by
the shape of G(h). Figure 2 shows (8) for a log-normal distribution in four
cases ranked by ®:
As far as the second part of the proposition is concerned, it comes from
the e¤ect of hc on the human capital c.d.f., as shown in Figure 1, which
increases dispersion among agents, pushing forward individuals above hc; we
shall be afterwards returning to this point in a greater details.
As we said, the characteristics of the human capital distribution function











13provides a broad measure of inequality. It is known that an increase in
the variance for a given distribution makes the new c.d.f. ‡atter than the
previous one, since the probability - or frequency - to …nd individuals lying
in the tails is higher. For the same reason, a distribution characterized by
a higher density in the low tail shows a ‡atter c.d.f. for medium-low classes
w.r.t. to a more equal - concentrated - distribution. The e¤ect of this higher
c.d.f. in the left tail a¤ects mainly the denominator of Eq. (8) with the result
to increase it. From here we have:
Remark 1 For ® given, Eq. (7) is ‡atter for positively skewed distributions.
Given a distributive law, then the same holds for an increase in the variance
of the distribution.
3 Dynamics.
In this section we are going to analyze the evolution of hc over time by means
of Eq. (7). As we said, because of the non-linearity of the Markov Chain
describing the evolution of hc, it is not possible to analyze the dynamics
in a formal way but we can fruitfully perform this by means of a phase
diagram. We start with the decreasing case for (7). Let G0 be the initial
human capital distribution function and hc0 the initial threshold drawn from
a given distribution Hc ; individuals above hc0 increase their inherited human
capital by ± and so does the marginal agent whose human capital increase
to h1 = hc0 + ±. The e¤ect is described in Figure 1 for the initial c.d.f.; the
bimodality is embodied in (7) which is shown in Figure 3.
The solid line shows the …nal trajectory and the arrows the transition to
h¤
c; the thin ones the modi…cation of (7) over time, induced by changes in
the human capital c.d.f. due to the evolution of the critical threshold; this is
the sense of the last part of Proposition 1. The transition to the equilibrium
value h¤
c shows an oscillatory dynamics, which is complicated by the shifting
of (7); it must be remarked, however, that h¤
c is achieved in a …nite time
which depends on the slope of (7), i.e. on the characteristics of the human
capital c.d.f. From here we have the following:
Proposition 2 The transition to h¤
c is as fast as the human capital c.d.f. is
‡at. Comparing a given human capital distribution with two di¤erent vari-
ances, for the same initial condition hc0, the equilibrium value h¤
c is as low
as the variance is high, i.e. as (7) is ‡at. The same conclusion does not hold
14hc0 hc 1 hc 2 hc 3 hc 4
hc* hct
hc t+1
Figure 3: Oscillatory Transition
comparing di¤erent distributive laws with di¤erent dispersion, since in this
case, the position of (7) changes in the phase diagram. In general, Eq. (7)
is ‡atter for an increasing dispersion and steeper in the neighboring of the
origin for an increase in the average value.
Proof. It comes directly from Remark 1; the last part refers to Eq.(8) since
an increase in the average value reduces the dominator, for hc ! 0; causing
the latter to converge faster to zero than the numerator.
As soon as h¤
c is achieved, individuals below it are trapped for ever since
the conditions in the labour market for unskilled workers change no longer
over time; the result is a steady increase in the human capital for individuals
above h¤
c, which amplify inequality over time. A way for trapped individuals
to escape is provided by the genetic shock, as we shall see.
The medium class is particularly involved in the transition path; the oscil-
latory behaviour creates a sort of ”stop and go” in human capital investment
for such individuals. The …nal e¤ect is a ‡attening and compression in the
medium class in an alternative way until the achievement of h¤
c: Such a fact
involves multi-modality in the human capital distribution.
The transitional dynamics is related to the value of ® that a¤ects the




Figure 4: Monotone Transition
slope in (7), then the transition to h¤
c is monotonic and shown in Figure 4.
As said, in this case we have a monotone convergence in a …nite time to
h¤
c, although the displacement of (7) makes longer or shorter the transition
depending on the slope coe¢cient, which is in turn related to ® and inequality
- variance - in the human capital c.d.f., as previously stated.
4 Accumulation.
The previous section analyzed the evolution of the human capital distribution
over time; now we are interested in examining the evolution of the average
value of such distribution which can be considered the accumulation path
of human capital in the economy. It is obvious, in fact, that the higher
the number of individuals investing in human capital, the higher the level
of average human capital; such a simple fact generates a link between the
evolution of hc and the growth of the average human capital. Clearly, the
average value is as high as hc is low; nevertheless the former depends on
several other variables, as we are going to investigate.
For the sake of simplicity, in the following we shall assume a maximum
value for human capital, say hM; this upper bound grows by ± at each time
16if the highest endowed individual invests in human capital; we can easily
extend our results to the limit case hM = 1: We start from the observation















As previously remarked, individuals below hct+1 do not increase their inher-
ited human capital, staying on the same level; for such a reason the part





0 ht+1gt+1(h)dh 8h < hct+1; for such a




hct+1 htgt(h)dh. Hence, taking
the di¤erence in the statistical mean between the two temporal instants, we
obtain:







From here the following proposition holds:
Proposition 3 ¢¹ h is positive. Moreover it depends positively on ± and
G(h); and negatively on hc:
Proof. In order to prove the proposition, we rewrite Eq.(9) as (ignoring the
subscript t + 1 for hc since there is not ambiguity in the notation):










Through the mean value theorem on integration, recalling that Gt+1(hM +
±) = Gt(hM) = 1;we can …nally write:
¹ ht+1 ¡ ¹ ht = (h1 ¡ h2)(1¡ Gt+1(hM)) (10)
where h1 2 (hM;hM + ±] and h2 2 [hc;hM]: Hence ¹ ht+1 ¡ ¹ ht is positive
and depends positively on the area of the tail of the human capital density
function above hM; moreover it is positively related to ± via h1 and negatively
to hc via h2:
By crossing Propositions 1 to 3, we obtain a more complete dynamical
scenario with the following Proposition:
17Proposition 4 In general initial distributions characterized by a high av-
erage value jointly to a large dispersion around it, induce a higher value of
h¤
c and a faster convergence; this in turn implies a lower accumulation with
an increasing dispersion. The converse also is true. This brings to the idea
that inequality is harmful for growth. Nevertheless the …nal result is strongly
dependent on the parameter set, particularly ®; and on the characteristics of
the initial distribution.
The above proposition provides a general description of the dynamics
but several particular cases are also possible; a comprehensive analysis is not
possible because of the strong dependence of Eq.(7) on the moments of the
initial distribution, other than on the parameters. As an example, a normal
distribution with high average value and low dispersion can provide a higher
hc than a log-normal with the opposite characteristics. This is due to the way
in which Eq.(8) is a¤ected, as we have pointed out in Proposition 2. From an
economic point of view, the modi…cation of (8) a¤ects directly the individual
decision about human capital investment, via Eq.(6); for hi given, an increase
in (8) induces individuals to give up to the higher education, shifting forward
the level of human capital necessary to invest in human capital.
In other words, comparisons among di¤erent initial conditions are rather
di¢cult, as well as the identi…cation of an unambiguous, well-founded rela-
tionship between accumulation and distribution of human capital; each case
should be carefully analyzed individually, since it greatly depends on the fea-
tures of the economy under investigation, features which are represented by
parameters and initial conditions.
5 The Stochastic Case.
In this section we are going to analyze how the stochastic component a¤ects
the results obtained so far. In this case each individual is characterized by
a shock ² representing the ”genetic” endowment; individuals with ² < 0 are
more skilled than the average (² = 0) and viceversa. As previously remarked,
² a¤ects only the educational e¤ort and not the productivity on job; for such
a reason it a¤ects the educational cost but not the wage. In the following we
assume that ²i is n:i:i:d: (0,¾2
²) across individuals and over time, i = 1;2;:::N:
The e¤ect of the genetic shock is to shift Eq. (6) upward and downward
around the mean value provided by ² = 0; the magnitude of the shift de-
pends obviously on ¾2
²: As previously noted, the genetic shock represents the
18only way for escaping from the unskilled area; under this point of view, the
stochastic model provides a more general result than the deterministic one,
and this agrees with authors (see Benabou,[4], for example) who stresses the
importance of the stochastic component in this type of models.
The stochastic component induces a continuous two-way jump across the
critical threshold provided by the marginal agent; the …nal e¤ect depends on
the total number of agents migrating from unskilled to skilled and viceversa.
Since symmetrical agents have the same probability to jump up or down the
critical threshold, the …nal balance depends on the number of individuals
entailed in the process, which obviously depends on ¾2
²; in other words, the







be the interval of con…dence, centered on hc, for a
given statistical level - say 95%; then the following proposition holds:













; then in the stochastic case there is a larger
share of population investing in human capital than the deterministic one,
reducing inequality and fostering accumulation. The converse also holds.







have a positive probability to jump the threshold hc thanks
to the genetic shock: this probability is as high as the individual human







region; for such an individual, in the deterministic
case, the variable z is negative and there is not chance to jump the threshold
hc: In the stochastic case instead, if the genetic shock ²i is su¢ciently low,
the variable z will be positive, allowing the individual to invest in human
capital. The value of ² making z = 0 is the following:
²
i¤ = (h
i ¡ hc) < 0



















region has a probability p = P(²i · ²i¤) to jump the threshold hc and a prob-






: At the same way, because of the symmetrical






region, at the same distance j²¤j, has
the same probability p = P(²i ¸ ²i¤ = (hi ¡ hc) > 0) to jump the threshold
hc; getting ”poor”.
Nowwe are …nally in position to demonstrate the proposition approximat-
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are approximated by the maximal
individual ¹ h, where now ²¤ = (¹ h ¡ hc) > 0: We mean by p = P(² · ²¤) the












to become poor, p = P(² ¸ ²¤ = (¹ h ¡ hc) > 0): We mean










: Given that for each individual there exists a probability p to jump
the critical level hc and a probability q = 1¡ p to remain in the same state,
the problem can be seen as a classical urn model. It is known that in such a
case the probability that n agents out of Ni cross (are drawn) the threshold







Ni are the binomial coe¢cients. If N1 > N2 we have P(N2;N1) >










is greater than the opposite event. The converse holds.
By so doing we have demonstrated a rather intuitive result: in the sto-
chastic economy less endowed individuals have a chance, missing in the de-
terministic case, to jump the critical level hc. There are at least two relevant
factors a¤ecting the magnitude of the probability. The …rst one concerns the
variance of the genetic shock, since the probability grows according to the
latter; two normal distributions centered on zero but with even moments -
20variance and kurtosis - di¤erent in magnitude provide two di¤erent values of
the jump probability. The second point concerns the possibility of asymmet-
ric, rather than symmetric, genetic shocks; if negative shocks have a higher
probability to occur than positive ones, then poor and rich individuals would
have a di¤erent jump probability irrespectively of the skewness of the human
capital distribution. This opens to the possibility to make endogenous the
distribution of the innate ability, as in Durlauf, [8]; for instance, one can
assume that the probability to jump from unskilled to skilled grows with the
proceeding of the accumulation process, which represents an improvement
in the standard of life. This model extension would provide an interesting
feedback between distribution and development.
6 A numerical exercise.
Because of the di¢culty in providing an explicit analysis of the dynamics,
the model was submitted to several numerical exercises, aiming to verify the
dynamical behaviour in di¤erent situations, with a particular interest in the
initial conditions. It is worth stressing that the results obtained agree fully
with the qualitative analysis previously described.
Due to the impossibility of reproducing totally the performed numerical
exercises, in the following will be shown two situations which refer to two dif-
ferent initial distributions. The numerical simulation uses a discrete version
of the model and refers only to the deterministic case; the human capital is
distributed among 35 classes of equal measure and there are 200 individuals
in the economy.
From a dynamical point of view, the most interesting pattern is provided
by the oscillatory path and for such a reason the following pictures refers to
® = 0:4; which is su¢ciently low to cause a downward slope in Eq.(7), as
stated in Proposition 1.
Figure 5 refers to two exercises built with the same parameter set but
with di¤erent initial distributions, viz. a log-normal10 [1;1] (at the top)
and a normal [3;1] (at the bottom). The …gure shows the density function
and the corresponding c.d.f. for each simulation after the achievement of
h¤
c. The convergence is much faster for the log-normal than the normal
distribution, as shown by the c.d.f. in both cases; while for the log-normal
10The cited log-normal is 1
x
p
2¼s exp(¡(log(x)¡¹)2=2s2); the parameters [1;1] refers to
¹ and s. This brings to an average value of 4.5 and a variance of 35.
21Log-Normal
Normal
Figure 5: Numerical Simulations
22the convergence is so fast that the oscillatory dynamics rests hidden, the
c.d.f. for the normal law shows a more complex transitional dynamics which
a¤ects mainly the medium class. This di¤erent dynamical behaviour is due
to the larger variance of the log-normal distribution; as stated in Proposition
2, this causes a ‡attening in Eq.(7), with a faster convergence process.
Simulating over initial distributions characterized by a high average value
and low variance, it is possible to obtain a longer transition phase, jointly to
a large oscillatory behaviour. As said, the transitional dynamics is greatly
a¤ected by the initial distributions, and in general it is hard to compare
di¤erent initial conditions.
7 Conclusions.
The results of the paper show how the dynamics of human capital accu-
mulation and distribution depends strongly on the interaction between the
characteristics of the distribution itself - the ”macro” variable - and the
”micro” variables - human capital endowment, genetic ability - via the in-
dividual choice about human capital investment. When individual decisions
are a¤ected by ”environmental” variables the economic evolution becomes
more complex and several dynamical behaviours are possible according to
parameters and initial conditions.
About policy implications, it is obvious that any reduction of the endoge-
nous poverty trap fosters growth. This opens to a redistributive policy which
can be implemented in two di¤erent forms: either reducing the educational
cost for trapped individuals or subsidizing directly the latter. Both cases
entail a taxation on skilled individuals. In a democratic context, the appli-
cation of the median voter principle is made more complex by the presence
of the critical threshold hc; even when the median agent is included among
trapped individuals, the optimal tax rate of the latter could not be su¢cient
to ensure the necessary tax-revenue which would allow to all agents in the
poverty area to escape from it. Given the economy described by the model,
the optimal tax rate for the median voter is the one which allows him/her
to jump the threshold hc but, as said, such a value could not ”polarize” the
preferences of the majority, if the tax-revenue is unsatisfactory. In other
words, in this scheme, the median voter looses the leading role played in
the traditional models of endogenous …scal approach. Under this point of
view, the policy action should be implemented by a central authority on the
23base of some measure of collective welfare; the more direct way is to make
the educational cost as low as possible, …nancing it by a taxation scheme
whose characteristics should be analyzed through the impact on growth and
inequality.
Finally a word on further re…nements. Given the dependence of results
on parameters, it is possible to add further non-linearities to the model
making endogenous some crucial parameters, enriching the range of possi-
ble dynamical behaviours. I refer especially to the coe¢cients measuring the
bargaining power, viz. ¯ and °, which could be depending on the unemploy-
ment rate in the economy; these re…nements should increase the possibility
of non-monotonic paths for accumulation and inequality. As remarked by
Atkinson,[2], in fact, the empirical observation is characterized by relatively
sudden changes in the inequality indexes; embodying such a feature in a the-
oretical framework, although simple, allows us to take into account a large
number of dynamical behaviours relating accumulation and distribution of
human capital; I hope this paper partially contributes to the goal.
24Appendix
In this appendix, we provide some technical details about the particular
Markov chain describing the accumulation of human capital. As we have
seen, the transition probability, for human capital, between two neighbor-
ing instants is represented by the valuation index zt; more explicitly the
transition probability depends on the state occupied at the present time hi
t,
distribution law of the noise term ² and human capital distribution g(h)
through the probability p: In the following we ignore the ² component, since
the latter is not the source of the non-linearity for the Markov chain.
The non-linearity is induced by the dependence of the transition rates on
the human capital distribution. In fact, if P(h+±;t+1) means the probability
of …nding the process in the h+± state at time t+1 being in state h at time
t, then we can write:
P(h + ±;t + 1) = p(h + ±;h)P(h;t)
where p(h+±;h) is the transition probability from state h to state h+± in the
unit of time. This is the traditional way one can write down the probabilistic
law for a Markov Chain; usually in such a process, the transition probability
does not depend on the distribution of h and for such a reason we de…ne it as
a linear Markov Chain. In our case this property holds no longer since both
terms on the R.H.S. depend on the distribution of h and from here the non-
linearity of the process. In the following we are going to identify the partial
di¤erential equation describing the evolution of such a process, although we
have no hope to provide a solution in a closed form.
For the sake of simplicity I assume that when agents do not invest in
human capital they incur in an obsolescence equal to the ± coe¢cient; this
assumption makes simpler the analysis inducing symmetry in the elemen-
tary steps, without a¤ecting results. In this way the chain can hop at one
elementary step only over a …xed distance ±; i.e. hn+1 = hn § ± where n is
the number of steps: Normalizing ht0 = 0, then the space state is the set
f0;§±;§2±;§3±:::::::g: By P(h;n + 1) we mean the probability of …nding
the i ¡ th agent at the position h after n + 1 steps; our goal is to derive an
equation describing the temporal evolution of this probability. We start from
the fact that the process can hop only over a distance ± which means that the
position h can be achieved only from h¡± or h+±; these states are occupied
respectively with probability P(h ¡ ±;n) and P(h + ±;n): Thus P(h;n + 1)
25consists of two parts stemming from two possibilities for the process to jump.
By p(h;h0); h0 = h § ±; we mean the transition probability to move from h0
to h: By so doing, we can write down the probability of …nding the variable
at the position h after n+ 1 steps:
P(h;n+ 1) = p(h;h ¡ ±)P(h ¡ ±;n) + p(h;h + ±)P(h + ±;n) (11)
where p(h;h0) = 0 unless h0 = h§±: Now we can approximate such a process
in continuous time and at this end we ”rescale” the integer n in n = t=¿;
where ¿ is the transition time per elementary step. In this way ~ p(h;h0) =
p(h;h0)=¿ is the transition probability per unit time. By subtracting P(h;n)
from both sides of (11) and dividing both sides by ¿ we obtain:
P(h;n+ 1) ¡ P(h;n)
¿
= ~ p(h;h¡±)P(h¡±;n)+~ p(h;h+±)P(h+±;n)¡P(h;n)
(12)
By indicating ~ P(h;t) = P(h;n=¿) we mean a new probability measure on
the rescaled variable t = n¿: Moreover, letting ¿ ! 0;we rewrite the above
equation as the following:
d ~ P(h;t)
dt
= ~ p(h;h ¡ ±) ~ P(h ¡ ±;t) + ~ p(h;h + ±) ~ P(h + ±;t) ¡ ~ P(h;t)
This linear di¤erential equation is known in literature as the Master Equa-
tion. Despite its seemingly simplicity, such equations have not closed solu-
tions and numerical simulations are often implemented. In our case however
the situation is even more complex because of the non-linearity induced by
the dependence of the transition probabilities on ~ P(h;t) itself.
The master equation represents the evolution of the probabilistic law of
a stochastic process assuming values on a discrete set in continuous time. To
avoid such coexistence of discrete and continuous variables the master equa-
tion is often approximated by a continuous-state, continuous-time process by
means of a rescaling analogous to the one used for the time variable. In this
way we bring the master equation to a partial di¤erential equation which is
usually more tractable, although our case does not allow such a facility.
By explicating the probability transitions in our case, the Master equa-













~ P(h+±;t)¡ ~ P(h;t)
(13)
where Z(zt) is the density function of zt: which depends on h and g(ht) =
~ P(h;t):
Approximating the (13) by a continuous space state variable means that
~ P(h;t) must be viewed as a density function, where now h acts as a con-
tinuous variable11; in order to avoid mistakes, from now and on we replace
~ P(h;t) with g(h;t) where g(¢;t) is the density function for h: By expanding
the R.H.S. of (13) into a Taylor series up to second order in ± = 0; and














The solution of (14), jointly to the boundary conditions g(h;0) = g(h)
and g(0;t) = 0; provides the unknown density function for the human capital.
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